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CHANGING DYNAMICS OF JAPANESE 
RELATIONS WITH AFRICA 
Rebecca Spyke, University of South Carolina 
Introduction 
Relations between Japan and African nations have never been 
close.' Various factors account for the lack of interaction between the 
two areas, including geographical distance, cultural differences, and 
Japan and Africa's particular relationships with the powers ofEurope and 
the United States. Yet, interactions between African states and Japan 
have existed since World War II. Relations between Japan and Africa 
have been shaped by three main factors: first, the influence of the major 
colonial and Cold War powers on Japan and Africa; second, Japan's 
world view, which spurred the nation to become a major superpower 
through nonmilitary means, and, third, Japan's view of itself as a 
nonwhite power which has through its strength overcome the adversity of 
a hostile world system and therefore has little understanding of those 
countries of Black Africa that have remained in the world's periphery. 
This article will explore how these factors have formed Japan-Africa 
relations during the late 1960's, when Japan experienced an incredible 
economic boom, and the early 1970's when Japan's world goals and 
strategies were altered by the two oil shocks during this period. 
Previous examinations of Japan-Africa relations are extremely 
few in number and have focused mainly on the changes in Japanese trade 
and aid policies towards Africa. For instance, Ichiro Inukai discusses 
how after the oil crises in 1974 Japan began to increase the amount of aid 
given to Africa.2 Inukai explains that aid is given to Africa for two main 
reasons. First, Japan gives aid in return for vitally needed natural 
resources and commodities. Second, there is a true humanitarian spirit 
still alive in Japan, and Japan often gives aid to Africa in order._to help 
alleviate poverty and the problems caused by violence. Yet, both the 
influence of the pressure placed on Japan by the United States to more 
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actively participate in world affairs and the influence of Japan's particular 
world view on its aid policy are not specifically discussed . S. Olu Agbi 
focuses mainly on trade and aid relations between Japan and Africa 
because , as he explains , other types of relations , such as diplomatic and 
political, have been extremely limited. Agbi does show that often these 
economic relations are political in nature because they are given in order 
to help secure needed natural resources and commodities to help maintain 
Japan ' s powerful position in the world.3 However , Agbi does not delve 
specifically into how the international political, economic, and social 
context have affected Japan's aid to and trade with Africa . 
Recent books and articles published by Japanese academics have 
criticized Japan ' s Africa policy, saying that, although Japan has greatly 
increased the amount of foreign aid in recent years, the assistance is given 
in the context of a lack of a proactive set of goals. Therefore, the purpose 
of foreign aid and of Japan ' s Africa policy in general remains undefined 
and relations remain distant. Kazuyoshi Aoki says that Japan ' s policy 
towards Africa fits into a fifty-year pattern of a Japanese foreign policy 
based on trial and error rather than on specifically defined goals.4 Hideo 
Oda also points out that, although consciousness of African problems has 
increased in Japan since the 1980's, Japan ' s Africa policy is not 
specifically stated . This vagueness, Oda states, may be due to Japan's 
fear of becoming increasingly active in Africa after the criticism Japan 
received because ofits continued trade with apartheid South Africa during 
the economic boycott. 5 However , these authors do not delve specifically 
into why Japan-Africa relations have remained distant through time. 
These authors neither specifically address the importance of the 
international context on Japanese-African relations nor do they examine 
how Japan ' s view of itself and its role in the world influence its 
interactions with countries of the South such as those in Africa. Japan 
since before it closed off its relations with nations of the West in the 
seventeenth century has perceived its role in the world as a vulnerable yet 
potentially powerful one . It has struggled to become a great power in 
order to not be subsumed ~y the strong forces of Europe, the United 
States, and China. Additionally , Japan has greatly influenced and altered, 
although not proactively, the dominant modes of thought about possible 
successful paths to development prevalent in the world. 
Africa's particular role in the global political and economic 
structure also affects international relations and thought, particularly with 
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respect to alternative conceptions of the state, the nation, and economic 
and political development. Africa is an area of the world which was first 
ravaged by colonial division and dependency and then by civil and 
regional wars and by international debt. It has been and remains tied to 
the international system which utilizes its natural resources, supports or 
overthrows its political leaders, and dictates structural adjustment 
measures which often are not compatible with its history and present 
political and economic systems. Africa and Japan have had different 
experiences that are related to their interactions with the international 
system created and led by the United States and Europe, but both areas 
have been and continue to be strongly tied to this world system. 
In order to examine the nature of Japan's interactions with 
Africa, it is important to analyze both their direct interactions and their 
indirect relations as affected by their dealings with the international 
political and economic system, their world views, and their views of 
themselves. These factors combined with the direct and indirect aspects 
of Japanese-African relations begin to explain the reasons why Japan has 
remained relatively inactive yet economically powerful in Africa. 
The Cold War Framework 
From directly after World War II until the mid- I 960's, relations 
between Africa and Japan were almost nonexistent. Yet, this period is 
still vital to the study of Japanese-African relations. The independence 
and nationalist movements in Africa began to form the structure and 
course of intra-African relations, relations with present and soon-to-be-
former European imperial powers, and Africa's role in and perspective on 
the world. In Japan, defeat in World War II, post-war occupation by the 
United States, continuation of some of the pre-war attitudes towards the 
world, and the push for postwar reconstruction combined in the 
formulation of postwar Japanese foreign policy. 
The drive for African independence and the resulting 
postcolonial entities left Africa with the huge task of determining its 
future course while attempting to deal with the colonial legacy. As 
Europe and the United States became embroiled in the East-West battle 
Volume 25, 1997 \ 77 
Rebecca Spyke 
of the Cold War, the power struggle had great effects on an Africa 
pushing towards development. The demand in the West for inexpensive 
primary commodities as well as strategic strongholds against the USSR 
contributed greatly to the continuing political and economic instability of 
many areas in the region. The establishment of the franc zone in the 
former French colonies, keeping these countries tied to France, limited 
their economic expansion. 6 Yet, for African economic and at points 
political survival, these relations were often seen as necessary by African 
entities . Often, African countries had little choice whether or not to 
accept the aid and influence of countries which were so large militarily 
and economically. 7 
These events spurred several movements in Africa calling for 
African continental or regional unity and independence from these still 
overly influential former colonial powers . Yet, the struggle to survive 
while attempting to stabilize their political and economic situations made 
it difficult for Africa to close itself off from the pressures of the West. 
Africa maintained commodity trade with the former colonial powers and 
with the U.S. and received aid from these countries . For example, Sudan, 
Somalia, Kenya, and Zaire (Congo) were considered key stronghold 
countries aided by the West as bolsters against communism. The unstable 
political situations and economic difficulties of these countries since 
independence is well-known, and their roles as pawns in the Cold War 
greatly contributed to this instability. 
Japan's experience in dealing with the Cold War world held only 
a few similarities to those of Africa. Japan was also greatly affected by 
the Cold War power struggle. However, Japan was treated very 
differently than Africa by the United States and Europe. Large amounts 
of capital, goods, and technology flowed into the country while the United 
States supplied it with military protection. Japan also oddly benefitted 
both from the destruction of its infrastructure during World War II and 
from the technology it had gained from its rapid prewar industrialization. 
Both these factors enabled Japan to utilize capital given by the United 
States to build a new, modem postwar infrastructure to establish a firm 
foundation for rapid reindustrialization. The prewar oligarchical political 
system also formed a hierarchical power structure which led the way to a 
powerful postwar bureaucr-acy and dominant one-party legislative system. 8 
Beginning with the occupation of Japan by United States forces 
after World War II, Japan started to forge a strong if not always cordial 
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relationship with the U.S. Article IX in the post-World War II Japanese 
constitution stipulates that Japan will not support a military and will not 
participate in military activity abroad. As the Cold War intensified, 
Japan's dependence on the United States for its defense shaped Japan's 
relations with other countries along the lines of US and Western European 
policy. 9 Particularly in its giving of aid, Japan took an anti-communist 
strategic approach, concentrating its aid in countries allied with the US 
and Western Europe without interfering with the policies of these powers 
in the region. 
This strategy worked until Japan grew so large economically that 
the U.S. began to protest against its economic policies which limited free 
trade. The U.S. often used the fact that the country was Japan's main 
protector in the Cold War to attempt to impel Japan into opening its 
economy to more imports. The push-pull relationship between the U.S. 
and Japan further strengthened Japan's resolve to be as indirect in its 
foreign policy making as possible so as to not incur the wrath of the 
United States while at the same time dealing with countries which 
possessed needed resource inputs or which had large import markets for 
Japanese goods, particularly important after the oil shocks of 1973-74. 
Japan's inactive foreign policy therefore enabled it to continue attaining 
its defense from the U.S . while dealing with most countries in a mainly 
economic manner. 
Beginning in the late 1960's, as Japan ran large world trade 
surpluses and became one of the richest countries in the world, Japan 
showed its support of anticommunism by targeting its Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) at anticommunist countries such as 
Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Zaire, and Malawi. 10 Additionally, as 
Japan continued to run large trade surpluses in Africa (see Tables 1 and 
2) in the 1960's, several countries invoked Article 3 5 of GA TT and 
imposed trade restrictions on Japan. In 1965, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda, and Nigeria began to restrict Japanese imports. Not 
coincidentally, Japan began giving yen loans to Africa in 1966, with 
Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda as recipients. 11 
Through its mainly economic foreign policy in Africa, then, 
Japan could secure natural resources and open markets to its products 
without becoming embroiled in political conflicts in the region that might 
bring it up against the policies of the Cold War powers of the U.S. and 
Western Europe. 
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The international context at the beginning of the Cold War 
contributed to the positions of both Africa and Japan in the world Cold 
War hierarchy . Whereas Africa became a Cold War battleground 
between East and West and a source of cheap commodity goods, Japan 
became a vital outpost for U.S. troops and a noncommunist anchor for the 
West in Asia as well as a source of cheap imports for the United States. 
Japan also had the internal drive to develop as rapidly as possible to 
become a powerful world player rather than be subsumed by the 
confrontational world system. Its status as useful tool to the U.S. and its 
complex bureaucratic governmental structure and drive to come back from 
the defeat of war combined to push Japan into the role as economic 
power . 
However, as Japan became more economically powerful, it did 
begin to assert some independence from the United States in the pursuit 
of its own economic interests . This beginning of a separation from the 
United States was reinforced by the oil crises of 1973-74, when Japan 
realized that its dependence on other countries for vital resources meant 
that another country ' s economic value to Japan was more important than 
that country's alliance with the United States. Japan therefore quietly 
increased trade and aid to some African countries which were not on the 
best terms with the U.S. but which either possessed potentially 
expandable export markets or had resources Japan could import cheaply, 
illustrated by trade with Mozambique (see Table 1 ). Japan pursued these 
economic relations quietly and apolitically, concentrating economic 
interaction in a few African countries, and avoiding confrontation with 
Western policies. Japan's sense of vulnerability and concentration on 
gaining world economic power will be examined in the next section. 
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Table 1: Japan's Trade with Four African Countries 
1955-76 (millions of yen) 
Za.ire Kenya Tanzania Mozambique 
Exporu Imports Exporu lmporu Exporu lmporu Exports lmporu 
19SS 1226 4S 168S 498 4611 1349 213 16S 
1960 S87 1399 798S 3209 3332 3436 663 1394 
196S 1871 1374 9236 1998 3S4S 1943 813199 3938 
1970 IS,S48 13,S39 14,958 1679 7767 6504 13,282 8130 
1971 22,S82 9390 17,063 2917 61S9 3202 13,068 8130 
1972 14,852 83SS 14,341 3038 6S23 3S32 11,863 96SI 
1973 13,813 22,1 IS 19,827 6600 11,612 4467 I0,70S 6601 
1974 19,646 31,659 30,291 7842 20,3SI S041 10,679 24,262 
197S 11,180 17,764 21,292 7794 16,060 3132 7072 18,796 
1976 9962 2S,632 29,97S 7026 22,39S 37S2 3960 10,633 
source: Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister's Office, Japan Statistical 
Yearbook, 1975 and 1980. 
Table 2: Japan's Foreie:n Trade by Area (billions of yen) 
Year Toi&! Asia South America Africa 
Exports Imports Export., Imports Export., lmporu Exports Import., 
19SS 723 889 302 324 SJ 37 74 22 
1960 1460 1617 S2S 493 64 S2 126 S9 
196S 3043 2941 990 983 89 140 294 127 
1969 S1S6 S408 9S1 16S0 173 273 41S 3S3 
1970 6954 6797 2181 2009 214 JS! Sl2 39S 
1971 8392 6909 2483 23S4 286 312 719 347 
1972 8806 7228 2491 2SOS 299 269 643 360 
1973 10,031 10,404 3187 37S3 38S 3S6 8SO 41S 
source: Bureau of Statistics, Japan Prime Minister's Office, Japan 
Statistical Yearbook, 1975. 
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World Views 
There exists a drive within Japan to become as strong as possible 
in order to be recognized as a powerful force in the world and to not be 
victimized by other large countries. According to Seizaburo Sato, the 
following principles have guided Japan's foreign policy for the past one 
hundred years: 
1. A strong sense of belonging to Japan and the Japanese race coupled 
with deep-rooted feelings of inferiority; 
2. Intense concern with improving the country's international status; 
3. Deep anxiety over being isolated internationally; 
4. Desire to conform to world trends; 
5. Emotional commitment to Asia. 12 
Japan's strong nationalism combined with its feelings of 
international vulnerability and the perceived need to become strong 
economically to survive have driven Japan to develop an economic system 
which, although dependent on foreign sources of oil, coal, and other 
resources, and which has grown so rapidly by concentrating on the 
development ofhigh-quality, inexpensive exports, has remained relatively 
closed to large amounts of noncommodity imports and foreign investment 
in Japan. Japan could maintain such a system because of its authoritative 
political culture and its usefulness to the United States during the Cold 
War. The U.S., although the main force behind the rules of international 
economic interactions as established in the Bretton Woods system, rarely 
cried out against Japan's far from free trade markets . Japan was more 
useful to the U.S. as a stable exporter of inexpensive goods than as an 
economically undeveloped entity that could fall prey to the claws of the 
communists . 
As Shigeru Yoshida, one of the primary formulators of 
contemporary Japanese foreign policy, writes in 1957, 
... Japan clearly must feed its 90 million people through 
trade. Given this, Japan's commercial ties naturally 
and necessarily stress America and Britain, which are 
the most economically affluent and technologically 
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advanced countries, and those with which we 
historically have the closest ties ... .It is simply the 
fastest and most effective way to promote the interests 
of the Japanese people. 13 
Japan was driven to develop economically to quell its sense of 
vulnerability and protect itself from the interests of the superpowers. 
Japan ' s view of the world as a place where it must struggle to survive was 
also part of the reason Japan supported the policies of the Western powers 
without actively forming its own policies that might conflict with those of 
its trading partners and defenders. Japan protects itself due to its 
perceived vulnerability in the world system by maintaining an inactive 
political policy and concentrating on developing its own economic 
strength. 
In contrast, although, as Nyong'o says, the colonial and Cold 
War legacy in Africa have hindered many African countries from making 
the state their own. 14 Several people in Africa have not merely sat back 
and watched Africa crumble. Discussions and debates as to how to deal 
with this continuing linkage with Europe and the United States, as well as 
how to develop particularly African nonconfrontational and nondictatorial 
economic and political systems, is_ ongoing. From Marxist scholars such 
as Samir Amin who call for Africa to form an alternative definition of the 
nation-state not based on Western conceptions of bourgeois leadership 
and the capitalist mode ofproduction 15 to Ali Mazrui ' s calls for Africa to 
refind its own strong, unique history and base African political and 
economic structures upon it16 to calls for pan-African unity as a means of 
forming a strong peaceful Africa, 17 scholars demonstrate the combination 
of Africa's subjugation by the international system and the empowerment, 
activism, and frustration that go along with lively, intense debate by 
Africans about possible strategies for their future. The desire to rise up, 
to change the unsatisfactory status quo, the disagreements about how a 
particularly African development path can be created, are discussions that 
were pursued intensely during the I 960's and l 970's and are still 
discussed by many on the continent. 
These African and Japanese perspectives also determined the 
nature of the relations between these two entities at that time and 
established the groundwork for what these relations were to become in the 
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future. However, Japan's continued booming economic growth combined 
with the oil crises of the l 970's began a drive towards a somewhat more 
active economic role in Africa. The oil crises of the early 1970's and the 
resource nationalism exerted by developing countries at this time spurred 
in Japan feelings of "resource danger" (shigenkikikan) and therefore 
Japan began the drive to establish closer relations with primary 
commodity exporters. The continued feelings of vulnerability in Japan 
are demonstrated by Japan calling itself shigensh61wku, or "few natural 
resources country ." 18 Japan depended on the world for its industrial 
inputs and relied on its industrial outputs for maintenance of a strong 
position in the world system. Its foreign policy towards developing 
countries was based in this strategic need for natural resources. 
Africa's options to limiting dependency on the European and 
American economic and political core were small. Africa's place in the 
international context as exporter of primary commodities could change 
little due to Africa's limited access to technology and the relative 
instability of the political systems and leaders in several African 
countries. At the same time, several African countries, to protect 
themselves against a new economic colonialism by newly-industrializing 
countries, exercised their right under GA TI article 35 to restrict imports, 
and therefore exports to Africa from Japan were limited.19 Although the 
Lome Convention of I 975 banned the special trade rights established by 
former colonial powers, several African countries continued to have de 
facto tied relationships, particularly to France and Portugal. Therefore, 
Japan perceived African markets as difficult to enter. 20 
Additionally, economic ties with Africa have been concentrated 
in a few countries. Japan has always felt shut out of the francophone and 
lusophone countries, which continued to maintain nontariffbarriers even 
after the 1975 Lome Convention. Japan has few Africa specialists who 
are informed about these countries. Japan also concentrates its trade in 
countries which have large internal markets or large amounts of natural 
resources, like South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Zaire. Direct 
investment in Africa makes up only two percent of Japan's foreign 
investments, halfofwhich from 1951 to 1981 was concentrated in Liberia 
to take advantage of its liberal tax and disclosure laws. The remaining 
investments are split between manufacturing ventures in countries with 
large domestic markets, like Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria or in 
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mining ventures in Niger , Zambia, Zaire, and Nigeria .21 
Ninety percent of trade was concentrated in 11 countries: South 
Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Sudan, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Zaire, 
Mauritania, and Tanzania. 22 Aid was also highly concentrated in a few 
countries and geared towards Japanese strategic interests. Eight countries 
received 70 percent of ODA from 1960 to 1990.23 Of these countries, 
Zaire, Zambia, and Niger are major suppliers of raw materials such as 
copper and uranium. In Madagascar, Japan has investments in the mining 
of chromium ore and in fishing . Sudan is a potent source of chromium. 
Kenya is pro-West, and imports ten times more Japanese goods than it 
exports to Japan. Tanzania is not as rich as other African entities in 
resources, but under Nyerere it represented the pan-Africanist opinion 
which called for African states to join together to seek freedom from 
dependency on the international economic and political system. By 
establishing economic ties with both Kenya and Tanzania, Japan could 
play both sides of the diplomatic fence, establishing alliances with 
countries not necessatily cordial with the West, which was important to 
Japan after the oil shocks in 1973-4. Japan maintained almost solely 
economic relations with countries such as Tanzania to make sure that no 
conflicts with the West were engendered. 
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Table 3: Japanese Bilateral Aid (ODA) to Africa 
(in millions of US dollars) 
Year Total ODA to Share of Total 
Africa ODA(%) 
1960-66 .73 2.0 
1967-69 8.10 8.2 
1969 3.77 1.1 
1970 8.15 2.2 
1971 12.38 2.9 
1972 5.01 1.0 
1973 18.49 2.4 
1974 36 .23 4.1 
1975 58.82 6.9 
1976 45.93 6.1 
1977 56.25 6.3 
1978 105.49 6.9 
1979 186.72 9.7 
1980 222.91 11.4 
Source : Japanese Ministry ofForeignAffairs Diplomatic Bluebook, 1981; 
Development Assistance, OECD-DAC, Paris, 1970 
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Table 4. Sectoral Breakdown of Japanese ODA to Africa 
(percentage of commitments) 
Year Social Economic Production Program 
Infrastructure Infrastructure Sectors Assistance 
1970 1.4 69.4 29.2 
--
1971 2.1 15.4 20.9 5.2 
1972 2.9 20.4 21.7 5.5 
1975 2.8 39.4 25.3 
--
1980 8.5 60.6 24.4 
--
( 1) Social infrastructure includes education, health, population programs, 
public development and planning services, etc. 
(2) Economic infrastructure and services includes transport, 
communications, river development, and energy. 
(3) Production sectors include agriculture, industry, mining, construction, 
manufacturing, trade, banking and tourism. 
( 4) Program aid includes structural adjustment programs and concentrated 
country program assistance. 
Source: OECD-DAC, Development Assistance, various reports, as 
collected by Nelson Noel Messone, Japan's Foreign Aid to Africa: 
International and Domestic Determinants Ph.D. dissertation, University 
ofKentucky, 1994. 
Building on the explanations given in the previous section, 
Japan's historical experience, world view, and ties to the United States 
and Europe propelled Japan to alleviate its fears of being cut off from 
needed natural resources to purs~e mainly economic and quite distant 
relations with Africa. Japan did not want to become involved in Africa's 
political, national, and ethnic struggles. Japan served as a military outpost 
for the United States and as an ally who almost always voted with the 
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United States in international organizations such as the United Nations. 
Japan also wanted to maintain a peaceful , unobtrusive position in the 
world in order to avoid fears of its returned aggressiveness after the 
events of World War II. It therefore rarely pursued a proactive foreign 
policy, particularly in regions where powers such as Europe and the 
United States were already active. 
Japan's View of Itself 
Japan has had little policy interaction with developing nations, 
particularly with Africa. It concentrated its efforts on developing markets 
in the industrialized nations. Japan had another reason for staying away 
from the developing world . As Yoshida writes, 
The Asian and African nations ... have relatively little 
organic interdependence with the economies of other 
countries ... their leaders are putting their main efforts 
into politically and socially ridding these countries of 
colonialism and dependency , not into fostering 
economic relations with other countries. These leaders 
want to avoid aligning with one side or the other in the 
bipolar global setup and devote themselves to 
marshaling the energies of their people for the task of 
nation building. This might be termed passive 
neutrality .... but their assertions of neutrality are not 
based on any particular economic or military strength. 24 
Japan had no interest in forming international relations with an 
Africa which it felt was dealing with struggles in which Japan did not 
want to participate. Japan had no need to take a stance in the struggle for 
independence and nation formation occurring in Africa , for it was secure 
in the strong ties and the military protection given to it by the United 
States. 
Another reason for distant relations with Africa is that Japan 
feels much more affinity with the developed countries of the West than 
developing countries of Africa or even Asia. As Yoshida wrote in 1957: 
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Japan today is actually more Western than Asian with 
respect to domestic politics, economics, industry, and 
social affairs .... The Asian and African nations, by 
contrast , are still backward societies with low living 
standards and undeveloped industrial bases and 
economies. 25 
Related to Japan's world view, Japan considers itself more Western than 
Eastern, more developed than developing . Not only does this view protect 
Japan against being subsumed by large powers, for it pushes Japan to 
continue in its quest for world power and strength although through 
nonmilitary means, but it does go into a view of the Japanese nation as 
something special, a country ~at is able to overcome the barriers of 
development and become strong even after the huge defeat of World War 
II. This view of the Japanese nation as unique and extraordinary has 
fueled a hesitation to associate with developing countries that are unable 
to help themselves to pull ahead. With the exception of aid to countries 
suffering from famine or other disasters, Japan gives little aid to the 
poorest countries of Africa 26 and maintains relatively distant diplomatic 
relations with most countries of the continent. Japan's view of itself as 
a special case, as a country different from those developing countries who 
are unable to shine in the world system, has impelled it to s~e little 
comn1onality with countries of the developing world . 
Japan began intensive industrialization in the late l 800's during 
the Meiji Era. The Japanese government was able to impel the Japanese 
people to come together and sacrifice the freedom and luxuries they may 
have otherwise been able to have for the sake of the nation's well-being . 
The government could pursue this route to development for two reasons: 
first, a large bureaucracy existed in Japan even during the Meiji Era that 
was capable of constructing and pursuing development policies that may 
have been politically hurtful to elected politicians . Japan was also run by 
an oligarchical group of ministers headed by the Emperor, all of whom 
were deeply respected in Japan and also were not elected officials. 
Second, the Meiji oligarchs perpetuated an ideology that, since Japan was 
a small island nation that perceived itself as vulnerable to the whims of 
the large powers, national strength and unity were vital to the nation's 
health. 27 Japan succeeded in developing rapidly at this time, which 
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reinforced the deep sense of nation that enabled the development to 
succeed. Masao Maruyama , a respected Japanese academic, also explains 
how this intense national pride fed Japan's fervid pursuit of victory during 
World War 11.28 
Although much has changed since World War II, the strong 
Japanese sense of nation still existed in the 1960's and l 970's as did the 
well-developed complex bureaucracy. Japan no longer had an Emperor-
led government, and Japan suffered greatly from its defeat in the war and 
the humiliation of being occupied by the United States, yet Japan was still 
a nation full of national pride and strength . Japan was able to use this 
strong sense ofnation and its well-organized bureaucratic structure to aid 
its second round of economic development, pushing Japan into the role 
of great economic power at this time.29 
Japan has had great indirect effect on the international structure 
through its rapid growth utilizing an alternative development approach to 
that used by the United States and Europe. Japan did not develop by 
sticking to the free market capitalist principles espoused by the World 
Bank and IMF. Instead, Japan protected its vital markets and used a 
large, authoritative state apparatus to drive growth . Rather than focusing 
on uniform economically-oriented policies such as interest and exchange 
rate adjustment and the limiting of state spending, Japanese development 
focused on an active, strong state role as the primary factor to economic 
development and growth. 30 This focus in the literature on Japan is 
interesting, for Japan's international role has mainly been economic, not 
political, and yet its development concentrated on the political, an 
authoritative state, ruling the economic . Japan has demonstrated that there 
are many paths lo development, not just the route followed by the United 
States and Europe. This reinforces Japan's sense of pride in itself. 
The push to show the world that it was a powerful nation, that it 
was strong enough to overcome the barriers to its development, meant that 
Japan could see little commonality between itself and the nations of 
Africa. These were countries which, as a famous Japanese developmental 
economist says, cannot necessarily follow another country's model to 
develop. 31 The countries must find their own way. Therefore, Japan 
could justify its hesitation to become too close to the countries of Africa 
by promoting a policy of self-help. This policy also kept Japan from 
being too closely associated with the developing world, as Japan 
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considers itself a country as powerful and able as the countries of the 
West. 
In 1974, Japanese Foreign Minister Kimura made a visit to five 
African countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, Tanzania, Egypt) and spoke 
against colonialism (shokuminchishugihantai) and for African ethnic and 
tribal freedom movements (minzokukaihoundo) . He supported what he 
called economic Africanization and pledged that Japan would begin to 
expand efforts to understand Africa as well as increase Japan's economic 
cooperation to the region .32 However, little substantially changed in 
Japan's policy towards Africa . Japan did begin giving Official 
Development Assistance to the region and increased the amount of trade, 
but political ties remained distant. 
The main reason for this visit and expression of understanding 
of Africa's causes is difficult to tell . Kimura's words may have been 
mainly to ensure cordial relations between Japan and those countries that 
could provide needed resources, at a time when African countries had 
expressed dissatisfaction with Japanese economic policy in previous years 
and sharply limited the amount of imports a}Jowed from Japan. Japan had 
responded to previous import restrictions by increasing its foreign aid to 
key countries in the region such as Nigeria, Zaire , Kenya, and Tanzania, 
and not coincidentally, following this action and the oil shocks of 1973-4, 
Foreign Minister Kimura visited Africa and spoke sympathetically about 
Africa's concerns. 
Japanese policy towards Africa remained unobtrusive and almost 
solely economic in nature. Not only did Japan want to avoid being put in 
a situation where it would need to formulate a more concrete, active 
political foreign policy, but Japan was succeeding in attaining its goals 
with the policy towards Africa it was maintaining at that time . Japan 
could show the West that it was using its trade surplus not only for its 
domestic benefit but was greatly increasing the economic assistance given 
to developing countries . At the same time, Japan could establish its place 
in the world system as the giver of aid, as a strong economic force on a 
par with countries of the West, rather than a late-developing country with 
more in common with Africa than with the West. Foreign aid not only 
secured needed resources for Japan, but was a symbol that Japanese pride 
in itself as a nation was warranted, for it was a powerful player in the 
world economic system that was coming to the aid of the less developed 
Volume 25, 1997 \ 91 
Rebecca Spyke 
world .33 
African aid recipients were also looking towards their strategic 
interests. These countries needed the funds which Japan was offering, 
and, although much of the aid was tied to agreements to contract Japanese 
companies to assist in the implementation of the project being funded, no 
political ties were suggested . However , it cannot be said that African 
countries viewed such non politically-tied aid with relief for many authors 
see Japanese aid as a type of neo-mercantilism that would further bind 
Africa to its role as international provider of natural commodities and 
flood the continent with Japanese imports.34 
Conclusion 
The influence of the Cold War and colonial powers on Africa 
and Japan , Japan ' s world view, and Japan ' s view of itself have 
determined how Japan fonned policy towards Africa in the I 960's and 
1970's. Japan's wish to remain allied with the U.S. and receive its 
military protection and economic aid, its perceived need to remain strong 
to prevent being subsumed by the world's powers, and its view of itself 
as a unique country that had used its own special talents to become a great 
economic power , have worked together to maintain distant relations 
between Japan and Africa. Japan saw little in common with Africa and 
wanted to refrain from becoming involved in African political conflicts 
in which the Cold War powers were already embroiled. 
Whether the economic relations that did exist between Japan and 
Africa were mutually beneficial is debatable . Japan continued to run huge 
surpluses in the region throughout the time period, taking away valuable 
foreign exchange from Africa. Japan did provide substantial amounts of 
aid to the region , although this aid was concentrated in few key countries 
and was often tied to contracts with Japanese companies. Japan's refusal 
to become involved in Africa ' s political problems also may have kept 
Africa from having a powerful non-Western ally with enough economic 
clout to help Africa against the whims of the U.S. and former colonial 
powers . 
Yet, Japan's distant relations with Africa may have been more 
helpful to the region than previously thought. Japanese trade and aid with 
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Africa did provide economic activity without more political policies being 
imposed. Japan did mainly support Western allies in the region, and 
therefore its trade and aid were indirectly politically motivated, but Japan 
did not impose its own views on an Africa that was being pushed and 
pulled in many political directions both internally and externally. 
Whether Japan's relations with Africa were helpful or hurtful, 
little changed in the context of the relations before or after the time period 
examined . More has been mentioned in Japan about Africa after the Cold 
War, as Japan is seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council and has suffered even more criticism for its supposedly 
mercantilist policies. However, due to the reasons previously mentioned, 
Japan will probably never forge close relations with the nations of Africa. 
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